This pap& presents the quantitative risk assessment for the storage of titanium tetrachloride (TiCl,). It is the major reactant used for the production of titanium in the titanium sponge plant. Titanium tetrachloride readily reacts with moisture, leading to the release of toxic hydrogen chloride (HCI). Fire explosive and toxicity index analysis, and hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies for the entire titanium sponge plant were carried out. Based on these studies, the TiCl, storage section was found to be one of the most hazardous sections in the titanium sponge plant. Fault tree analysis technique has been used to identify the basic events responsible for the top event occurrence, ie, release of HCl due to the hydrolysis of TiCl, upon contact with moisture in the environment during spillagelleakage of TiCl, from the storage tanks and to calculate its probability. Consequence analysis of the probable scenarios has been carried out. The risk has been estimated in terms of fatality.and injuries. Based on these results, basic input in the form of recommendations for possible changes in the design and operation of the titanium sponge plant have been made for the risk management.
INTRODUCTION
Assessment of risks involved in the design and operation of process plants has become exceedingly important due to the trend towards setting up more complex units with toxic, flammable or otherwise hazardous chemicals at extreme temperatures and pressures. The potential risks of such plants get magnified with the larger units and also due to the proximity of location to densely populated areas, if any. Increasing public awareness of technological risks of such units, thus, has placed an onerous responsibility on the process industries to review their current safety practices and scientifically devise these to make the technologies, both intrinsically and extrinsically safer. Towards this goal, risk and hazard analysis has emerged as a modern tool, to define the potential occupational hazards to titanium sponge plant personnel and surrounding environment, and public and enable computing the associated risks based on the probability of likelihood and consequence levels.
This study relates 'to the storage of large quantity of RCI, in tanks required for the production of titanium sponge in large, commercial-size batches. Titanium tetrachloride is a colourless, clear, fuming liquid with low viscosity and suffocating odourl. Some of its proper tie^^.^ are shown in Table 1 . Titanium tetrachloride contains the Ti-X bond and has pronounced haloanhydride character, being highly reactive and a g g r e~s i v e~.~. On escape from the containment and exposure to moisture, it reacts readily, violently, and exothermically with water, releasing copious volume of HCL gas and producing titanium oxy chloride (TiOCl,) solid. A survey of accidents that occurred in USA between January 1990 and November 1999 revealed that there had been 473 incidents involving spillage of TiCl, alone, out of which 13 involved evacuation, injuries, or deaths8-". In an accident in 2001, the TiCl, evolved was as little as a few hundred milliliters, which was enough to generate a considerable volume of HCl affecting the employees at the titanium sponge plant and the staff of the neighbouring premises, as the resultant escaping gas drifted towards them',. Thus, this study aims at quantifying the hazards and consequences relating to the storage of TiCl, using the fault tree and consequence analysis techniques for estimating the risk to the environment and to identify the measures to be incorporated in the design and operation of TiC1, storage tanks.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION-TITANIUM TETRACHLORIDE STORAGE
Fire explosion and toxicity index (FETI) analysis and hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies have been used to identify the hazardous sections of the titanium sponge plant. One of the major hazards identified from the HAZOP studies is the release of HCl due to the hydrolysis of TiCl, upon contact with moisture in the environment during the spillage1 leakage caused by the rupture of TiCl, from the storage tanks.
On the basis of FETI analysis, the storage section has been categorised as medium toxicity hazard and low fire and explosion hazard. The storage section comprises three, 25 T capacity, horizontally placed SS 304L tanks. Titanium tetrachloride is transferred to the adjacent sections and the standby tanks through pipelines. As the inventory of the TiCl, material in the storage section is large, it has been taken up for detailed qualitative and quantitative assessments.
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
The fault tree analysis technique gives all possible minimum combinations of basic equipment, instrument, --and operator's failures, called minimum cut sets, which could lead to the occurrence of the critical event, commonly known as the top event. The fault tree is solved to obtain the set of basic events whose combination could lead to the occurrence of an unwanted top event. On the basis of FETI analysis and HAZOP studies, the fault tree for the critical event, ie, release of HCI gas has been constructed.
Fault Tree Construction
The complete fault tree is shown in Fig. l(a) to l(e). The failure rates of the events are based on the data from several sources" 14, suitably modified, whenever necessary, to account for the Indian conditions.
Fault Tree Analysis
The total number of minimal cut sets for this fault tree has been computed to be 414. The minimal cut sets in order of increasing the number of years or decreasing the number of occurrence of top event are listed in Table 2 . Operator's error and electricity failures have been identified as the basic failures which result the operator-related failures are generally more in high frequency of top event occurrence. The common than the instrument-related failures, and failure rate of the top event has been calculated due to their unpredictability, the complexity of to be 1.55 E-03. Titanium tetrachloride is used and transported in its liquid phase, and therefore on spillage, it atmosphere. TNO effects model and TNO yellow
book" have been used to carry out the consequence analysis.
When water TiC1, + 2 H , 0 u T i 0 2 +4HCl ( 2 ) 4.1 Pool Radius Calculntion In excess
Generally for chemical storage tanks, release This highly exothermic reaction supplies the of half of the tank capacity is normally considered. pool with energy, thereby raising its temperature However, for the storage in close grouping of and vapour evolution rate. The pool formed usually three or more tanks, a large quantity is assumed to be released, 90 per cent in the case of vertical 4.3 Dispersion Calculations tanks and 80 per cent in horizontal tanks. It is assumed that out of 2ST of TiCl, stored in the tank, 20T is released on rupture of the tank, forming a pool. Based on these, the radius of the pool has been calculated to be 22.6 m.
Moisture Availablility
In most cases, the reaction of TiCI, with moisture proceeds under excess of TiCl,, with HC1 dispersing into the atmosphere. During spreading, the pool encounters free ground water, substrate water, and also absorbs atmospheric moisture. After spreading has ceased, the water is absorbed only from the substrate and the atmospheric moisture.
Assuming a time period of 30 min for the reaction of ECI, released with the available water, the source strength of HC1 evolved was calculated to be 2.12 kgls (Appendix 1). Figure 2 depicts the directional IDLH (145 mglm3) contour during monsoon. Figures 3  and 4 give the variation of concentration with the downwind distance up to TLV and IDLH limits. The population staying within a radial distance of 1300 m needs to be evacuated within 30 min, while the population staying within a radial distance of 8650 m needs to be alerted. The data for the model is based on the wind speed data provided, and the scenario has been estimated (Appendix 1) using a wind speed of 2 m/s and ambient temperature of 33 "C. 
Effect of Seasonal Variation
time) is west-north-west, so the probability of HCl dispersing in this direction is the maximum. Based on the wind rose Pattern supplied by During winter, the wind direction is reversed with the local meteorological department, the predominant the pl;me pointing towards east-south-east (47 % wind direction during monsoon (17 % of the of the time). 
Incident Outcome Frequency Calculations
The frequency of release of HCI due to storage tank rupture was found to be 1.55X per year. Based on this data and the directional wind probability, the incident outcome during monsoon and winter have been calculated. The results for monsoon and winter are summarised in Tables 4 and 5 . This value is beyond the acceptable limits of 10-6events/year as given by TNO for catastrophic events (with large consequences in terms of fatalities). Tables 6 and 7 indicate the incident outcome after implementation of the recommendations. As is apparent, the incident outcome has been considerably reduced (7.23E-08). which is well within the acceptable limits. 
Damage Calculations
The effect calculations give the extent of the IDLH and TLV plumes, while the probability calculations give the directional probability of the incident outcome. Their damage potential is calculated based on the extent of IDLH plume and its superimposition on the layout of the titanium sponge plant and the surrounding areas. Tables  4 and 5 give the area of exposure and population at risk during monsoon and winter. If effective measures are instituted to evacuate within 30 min the affected population residing within 1.3 km radius, the damage to the personnel present within the titanium sponge plant who might be affected, immediately comes down.
CONCLUSION
The release of HCI due to the rupture of TiCZ, storage tank has been quantitatively assessed. On the basis of the probability calculations using fault tree analysis technique as well as the effect and damage calculations &ing consequence analysis, an assessment of the individual risk has been carried out as follows:
The effect of the seasonal variation on the risk values was considered as environmental conditions, namely humidity, wind direction, and wind velocity, which have a substantial bearing on the quantity of HCI released and its dispersion into the environment. Individual risk values for both the monsoon and winter, have been estimated and the results are summarised in the Tables 8  and 9 . The total individual risk, as seen from these tables, is 2.37 fatalitieslyear during monsoon and 0.67 fatalitieslyear during winter. Incorporation of the suggested preventive measures brings down the probability of occurrence of the top event, ie, spillage of TiC1,and the subsequent release of HCI. This reduces the risk to 4.79E-05 fatalities1 year and 3.87E-05 fatalitieslyear for both monsoon and winter seasons (Tables 10 and 11 ). After implementation of the protective measures, ie, evacuation of the people, and assuming only 5 personnel to be present at the site, the risk comes down to 3.6 E-07 fatalitieslyear.
On comparison with the risk assessment matrix given in the Table 12 , the frequency of 1.25E-03 eventslyear for monsoon (before implementation 
